The Economic Struggle of German Jews, 1933-1943 (Part C)
Source: A. Barkai, From Boycott to Annihilation, The Economic Struggle of German Jews 1933 - 1943, Hanover & London 1989, pp. 37 - 53, 77 - 92, 106 - 109.
This agreement must likewise be evaluated in the context of the reaction of German Jews to the catastrophe that had befallen them. Despite the political turbulence and constantly exacerbating anti-Semitism in the Weimar Republic that had preceded the National Socialist regime, the Jewish population and its leadership were almost completely unprepared for that catastrophe. Today we can only admire the ability they evinced to adjust swiftly to the changed situation, rely on their own wits and resources, and proceed to create a comprehensive and relatively well-organised system of Jewish self-help. Not all the problems could be solved in this way, even though many of the new programs and initiatives of the year 1933 were improved and expanded in the ensuing period. Later on, German Jewry find itself facing ever new forms of repression and persecution in the economic sphere and beyond - repression against which it ultimately proved unable to muster any defence.
The Daily Struggle for Survival
Between 1933 and 1938, German Jews experienced alternating phases of hope and despair. A few calm months were enough to awaken optimistic expectations for stabilisation, which might, in spite of it all make economic survival feasible in Germany even if such a life would now be more laborious in its demands and stintingly modest in its rewards. The outbreak of boycott actions, on the other hand, helped to lend credence to pessimistic assessments. Optimists and pessimists differed primarily in respect to the intensity of their preparations for emigration. Initially, however, all had to invest the bulk of their energies in the daily struggle to scrape together enough to allow themselves and their families a relatively decent level of existence.
Jewish occupational structure underwent an accelerated process of restructuring, though this had very little to do with the earlier 'productivisation' aimed at various groups in the Jewish community. Along with the restructuring organised by Jewish self-help associations, a spontaneous and more regressive occupational restructuring process took place, in which the old vocation of peddler once again became a respected calling after having almost totally vanished from Jewish occupational statistics since the end of the nineteenth century. Former doctors and lawyers, as well as junior- and senior-level officials, now turned itinerant travelling through the countryside or from house to house with their goods and samples. Because this activity required a permit for trade or peddling, it was listed in the statistics of the government offices as the 'establishment of a new business' by Jews, just like the transfer of a store into one's private residence. Party offices and interested middle-class businessmen, especially in the retail garment area, believed they could see in this a sign of an increase in Jewish economic activity and were correspondingly alarmed. In re, the volume of business transacted by Jews was shrinking steadily. The turnover in sales outlets that had been shifted to private dwellings declined, despite the general pickup in overall demand. Jewish travelling salesmen, who often were the victims of dishonest swindlers, were in many cases unable to cover even their transportation expenses. 67
The shrinking of business volume also necessitated a reorganisation of the form of the business in order to economise. The family business was the most suitable modus because women and young school leavers had few prospects for employment in any event. The shift of commercial and artisan shops into one's private residence made this transaction easier. Doctors and lawyers who still had a small practice employed members of their phenomenon as an expression of the strengthened 'community of fate' ( Schicksalsgemeinschaft ) of the Jewish family and proof of its will to survive. In distress and under duress, the Jewish family had abandoned its resistance to the idea of married women going out to work. The ancient Jewish tradition, according to which the woman in the devout family often provided a living for her Talmud-studying spouse, was cited as a laudable example 68 .
Soon after 1933, there was a change of direction in organised Jewish financial assistance. There were hardly any illusions about the value of legalistic intentions. If one applied at all to the authorities, an attempt was made to locate those case workers who were prepared, as decent human beings, to help Jews in a difficult situation, if they could in any way.' 69 The principal efforts were increasingly aimed at providing direct financial assistance. In the first few years of the Nazi regime, there was still hope to provide a secure, albeit altered, basis for the continued existence of German Jewry for many years to come by means of an 'economic rehabilitation program.' By the end of 1936 at the latest, people became convinced that emigration should be regarded as the most comprehensive form of a constructive program of economical aid.' However, in view of the structure of the German Jewish community and the restricted possibilities for immigration in other countries, a substantial Jewish population was likely for some time to come, consisting of individuals who were subjectively and objectively unable - or not yet able - to emigrate.' 70
Offices of the Wirtschaftshilfe could now be found throughout the country. The district centres served Jews resident in smaller localities in particular. The circle of those needing assistance had a different composition compared with 1933 and was now broader in compass. In 1936, more than sixty-two thousand persons received advice and relief aid. The proportion of those from the free professions was considerably smaller as a result of emigration and the absorptive capacity of the developing Jewish educational system and network of Jewish cultural institutions. In contrast, there was a steady rise in the number of jobless self-employed and white-collar workers as a consequence of the process of 'quiet displacement.'
The Jewish credit associations attempted to provide support for the self-employed. They distributed two types of loans: 'category A' loans, lent against collateral and at an interest rate of 3 to 6 percent, and 'category B' loans to businessmen who were economically worse off. The latter were interest-free and generally did not require collateral; they were repayable 'according to ability' and without any due date. In both cases, only small sums were involved, and the distinction between the two categories blurred over the course of the years. This division into categories was abandoned completely in 1936, since only a few of the applicants were able to provide the necessary collateral according to rules that had been laid down by the 'Joint.' A new version was now introduced, 'category Z' loans, designated almost exclusively for use in covering moving expenses or in connection with the liquidation of existing businesses.
Between 1933 and 1938, the credit associations distributed 12,300 individual loans totalling RM 4.5 million. This amounts to an average of about RM 370 per loan, a sum that can serve better than any description to characterise the modest clientele of these credit associations. Human beings in deep financial straits, facing the total collapse of their economic existence, were sometimes also helped by loans of just RM 100 or RM 200. The associations often provided indispensable financial first aid. The capital of such loan associations often provided indispensable financial first aid. The capital of such loan associations was insufficient for long-term activity or for credit needs of businesses. Their clientele consisted almost exclusively of individuals on the economic margins of society, small tradesmen and house-to-house and market peddlers, including a large number of Eastern European Jews. Accordingly, these credit associations should in retrospect be viewed as an institutional component of the broader welfare system 71 .
A number of Jewish co-operative banks served the credit needs of the wealthier middle classes. A few such banks had been in existence for some time but really came into their own only during the Nazi period. One example was the Ivria Bank in Berlin, principally for Zionist-oriented circles; another was the Jewish Credit Association, which catered to the liberal circles around the Centralverein. There were Ivria banks in Leipzig and Chemnitz as well, not surprisingly, as these were cities with a high proportion of Eastern European Jews. Despite the uniform name, each of these banks was an independent co-operative with its own capital funding. Their importance for the system of economy and finance in the Jewish community in Germany was greater than that of the credit associations. The Ivria in Leipzig, for example, reported capital assets in 1935 of RM 1.35 million and a volume of 59 million 72 . Nonetheless, the co-operative banks covered only a small portion of the credit needs of Jewish businesses. The upper middle classes and the Jewish large entrepreneurs calculated their needs in quite different and much larger figures. They continued to obtain loans for a time from the general banks and increasingly from the Jewish private banks, for which there is no available data on total volume.
At an early point in developments, offices and organisations involved with providing economic assistance were aware of the obligation to assure as orderly a liquidation of the Jewish enterprises in Germany as possible. This is reflected in the establishment, initiated as early as 1934, of a special 'Society for the Promotion of Economic Interests of Jews Now or Formerly Resident in Germany, Ltd.' 73 This long and complicated name had been invented by the official charged with registering the organisation, who even in 1934 apparently had trouble imagining there could still be anything like 'German Jews' in the country. The complete name was almost totally unfamiliar among the Jewish public, the organisation being known by its familiar abbreviation, F.W.I. The declared task of the society was to prevent the hasty sale of Jewish enterprises and to salvage as large a portion of Jewish assets as possible by means of expert advice and orderly handling of all transactions, using domestic and foreign financial institutions.
The society was apparently thought of as a tool to serve larger business enterprises. Its offices were located on the Kurfuerstendamm in Berlin, and it tried to project an image that was solid and inspired trust. There were leading Jewish personalities on its board of directors. The banking house of Gebr Arnholds was likewise involved and had a financial interest in the initiative. Despite all of this, the society was unable to point to any substantial success, a result of the initially hesitant attitude of Jewish entrepreneurs and of the differences of opinion within the board of directors regarding the economic future of Jews in Germany. Even after these differences had become irrelevant under the pressure of events, and there was general recognition of the necessity for business liquidations, the F.W.I. never really came into its own. The large Jewish entrepreneurs went their own way in arranging transfer of capital and assets, and those with medium-size and small businesses found solutions in the framework of the Haavara Agreement or parallel organisations, which is discussed later (see 'Emigration and Transfer of Assets').
The Expanded 'Jewish Economic Sector'
Only a smaller number of the large Jewish department stores and businesses were able to retain their Jewish directors and a clientele not directly exposed to the pressures of the party. With this one exception, the Jewish community must now live in its own framework, and is increasingly taking on the character of a new type of ghetto. A ghetto which is admittedly not surrounded by walls, yet which is cut off from economic as well as social and intellectual contact with the surrounding world. The typical German Jew today is a middle-aged man, whose children have emigrated and who ekes out a meagre existence as a small businessman in one of the larger cities.' 74
This description, taken from the 1937 annual report of the major British assistance organisation for German Jewry, the Council for German Jewry, paints and accurate picture. The developments described had been forced on the German Jews by external circumstances, and the 'Jewish economic sector' had evolved over the course of the years against their will. At the end of 1936, voices still could be heard among the Jewish public decrying a Jewish 'economic ghetto' and rejecting any abandonment of positions still in Jewish hands 75 . Yet the pressure of circumstances proved to be stronger.
Naturally, it is impossible to speak about any sort of autarky of the Jewish sector for the simple reason that Jews were dependent on goods and services that they were unable to manufacture or supply themselves. However, as producers and employees, they were increasingly dependent on the internal 'Jewish market,' which was becoming even smaller. Those who had left active economic life lived first off the proceeds from liquidation and lifelong savings and then off their very bone and substance. Or they were dependent on Jewish welfare, financed by funds from Jews still able to contribute, or, to a lesser extent, by assistance from co-religionists abroad.
The administrative bureaucracies of the Jewish Gemeinden and organisations had not only been enlarged to help cope with the growing tasks, they represented a kind of 'scheme for creation of jobs' from the funds of the Jewish public sector. These monies derived largely from tax revenues paid by the German Jews themselves. Jewish doctors found work in an impressive publicly supported health system, equipped with hospitals and homes. Former lawyers were able to make use of their knowledge and experience in Jewish administration. Teachers were placed in the significantly expanded Jewish educational system and in adult education, often as language teachers in courses preparing for emigration. Writers and journalists worked for the Jewish press and in Jewish publishing houses, which flourished on a scale hitherto unknown 76 .
This development was also reflected in the ad sections of Jewish newspapers, which published the addresses of still practising Jewish doctors and dentists and of attorneys whose licenses were still valid. Even without any special appeal, most Jews frequented Jewish physicians and specialists. Jewish boarding houses in spas announced the availability of kosher cuisine. They were preferred by non-Orthodox clientele as well, even before signs proclaiming 'Jews not wanted' made their appearance in most hotels. The advertisement sections of the papers became more and more voluminous and reflected all facets of the 'Jewish economic sector': ads from job seekers and, far less frequently, want ads for vacancies, announcements concerning stores and artisan shops and businesses of all kinds, apartments and rooms to rent - a diversified picture of everyday occupations and needs, which necessarily brought together again individuals who had log been estranged from the Jewish community. The process of economic liquidation was also manifested in the pages of these papers: businesses and properties, furniture, and concert pianos were offered for sale at bargain prices 'due to emigration.' 77
The bureaux of the Wirtschaftshilfe increasingly became offices for the provision and co-ordination of services in the 'Jewish sector.' The bulletin Vermittlungsdienst stopped publication in 1936 because no corresponding responses were forthcoming from the numerous ads offering something for sale or requesting capital. Jews who had capital as a result of liquidation of businesses or other sources generally were chary of investing it in Jewish enterprises. They increasingly preferred various forms of liquid accounts, which were then available to them whenever needed for emigration or purposes of everyday living. On the other hand, the Wirtschaftshilfe bureaux and the Jewish Gemeinden and organisations now had at their disposal 'means of advertising' in order to stimulate mutual Jewish economic intercourse. Loans could be granted in the form of shipments of goods from Jewish commercial firms and manufacturers. The extensive orders placed by Jewish institutions were also give, wherever possible, to Jewish suppliers. Jewish sales representatives and agents were furnished with recommendations to Jewish firms. The agricultural teaching farms and artisan crafts training centres bought their supplies from Jewish firms; in turn, they passed on their own produce and products whenever possible to those same concerns for distribution and sale. This is also true in the case of hospitals, schools, and welfare organisations - in short, the entire Jewish 'public' sector. That sector, taken as whole, represented a quite sizeable market in its own right 78 .
Since more and more Jews were being turned away or placed at a disadvantage by the German banks, the Jewish credit institutions gained in importance. The already mentioned co-operative banks tripled their deposit accounts and loan volume. The existing mutual insurance firms were also able to show substantial growth 79 . However, the statistical data on the number of insured and the principal of the policies prove, like the data from the Jewish co-operative banks, that in both instances only a fraction of total amount of Jewish insurance or loan credit was represented here. As a consequence of the liquidation of firms, Jewish entrepreneurs apparently were no longer in need of credit. On the contrary, they now had liquid reserves at their disposal or were able for a time to make use of both general and Jewish banks for their needs. In any case, the insurance companies were by no means equipped to take on a substantial proportion of Jewish insurance requirements.
An arbitration office was established in the Berlin Wirtschaftshilfe, in which Jews were able to resolve business disputes by working out an arbitrated compromise. In view of the prevailing atmosphere in the German courts, this was a welcome alternative 80 . Orthodox Jews, especially in the Eastern European milieu, had always preferred the traditional religious rabbinical court system internal to the Jewish community; in a revised and secular form, a new version of this ancient judicial custom was now adopted by less religiously observant Jews.
Jewish workers, both blue- and white-collar, were even more dependent on the Jewish sector than the self-employed. Even after full employment was reached in the German economy, it was almost impossible for them to be hired by non-Jewish employers because the prerequisite for such employment was formal membership in the DAF. Jewish employers, especially smaller firms, figured out various ways to circumvent these regulations. Even larger enterprises sometimes devised ways to retain at least a portion of their Jewish work force and, in some instances, to treat these workers in exemplary fashion. Also, Jewish solidarity was often manifested in working conditions and personal relations on job, though not in all cases. For example, the owner of the Schocken department store concern assisted Jews in its employ with the preparation and implementation of plans for emigration. Of some 250 Jewish workers in Schocken, 150 had left Germany, together with their families, by October 1935. The owners of the N. Israel department store in Berlin assisted their employees in a similar fashion 81 . There were undoubtedly analogous responses in many other large Jewish-owned firms, but the relatively low percentage of Jews in a work-force numbering in the thousands proves what little importance such still extant firms actually had for the internal Jewish labour market.
Even before the take over by the National Socialist, there had been a number of job placement bureaux in the larger Jewish Gemeinden in Germany. These bureaux were federated together in the publicly recognised United Central Organisation for Jewish Job Placement (Vereinigte Zentrale fuer juedische Arbeitsnachweise). Until its forcible dissolution at the end of 1936, this organisation took on an increasingly important role in both job procurement and the channelling of internal Jewish migration. Over the course of the years, it became clearer and clearer that its activity was condemned to failure, an unending labour of Sisyphus: thousands of job seekers faced with a steadily shrinking pool of vacancies. No more than 20 percent of the jobless commercial workers, who made up the bulk of job seekers, were eventually placed. A somewhat higher percentage of success was achieved for female job seekers, especially after the introduction of the Nuremberg Laws. The Jewish jobless were not choosy either: Trained bookkeepers were prepared to work as shop assistants or errand boys, and experienced secretaries hired out as domestics. Young school leavers, more and more of whom wished to learn artisan trades, found fewer and fewer available apprenticeships because Jewish craft trades were also on the decline 82 .
References:
67.The worry of the party offices was manifested in the exchange of the district leadership in North Westphalia; SaA Muenster, nos. 10 (1935), 25 (1937). On the true situation of the Jewish representatives, see Israelitisches Familienblatt , 5 March 1936.
68. C.V. Zeitung , 19 December 1936; Israelitisches Familienblatt , 14 November 1935.
69.Sabatzky, in Richarz, vol. 3, p. 293. See also Weil, ibid, p. 271.
70. RV/Arb . 1936, p.103; see also Adler-Rudel, p. 121ff.; Szanto, "Economic Aid," p.208f.; Szanto and Loewenberg, in Richarz, vol.3 , pp.221, 246f.
71.This presentation based on the following: Margalioth, "Tendencies," p.345f.; Szanto, Erinnerungen, p.134; Adler-Rudel, p.124f; C.V.Zeitung , 7 November 1935; RV/Inf., no.12, December 1936, p.127f.; Bauer, p.130f. Likewise, the informations sheets and annual reports of the Reichsvertretung generally, 1934 to 1937.
72. C.V.Zeitung , 23 April 1936.
73.German name: Gesellschaft zur Foerderung wirthschaftlicher Interessen von in Deutschland wohnhaften oder wohnhaft gewesenen Juden m.b.H. See the following: RV/Arb . 1935; RV/Inf ., no.3-4 (1936); YVA, 01/273.
74.Council, 1937, p.7.
75.Margaliot, "Tendencies," p.348f.
76. RV/Arb , 1934-37; see Poppel, Salman Schocken and the Schocken Verlag, YLB 17(1972): 93ff.; M.T.Edelheim-Muehsam, "The Jewish Press in Germany," YLBI 1(1956): 163ff; E. Simon, "Jewish Adult Education IN Germany as Spiritual Resistance," YLBI 1(1956): 68ff.
77."Die juedische Presse als Wirtschaftsspiegel," Israelitisches Familienblatt, 2 April 1937.
